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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
EDNA L. KOPP, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
12999 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
At the trial of this case, before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, it was agreed and stipulated that the Court could 
consider the evidence given at the Industrial Commission at 
the trial de novo ( R. 64) . The testimony tendered at the trial 
was for the purpose of supplementing the transcripts of the 
record of the Industrial hearing. Therefore, in citing the record, 
the Respondent will designate the Industrial Record as (I.R.1) 
and will designate the Record at the trial as ( R.I.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This matter was originally initiated on November 20, 
1969 by the Respondent when she filed a notarized Complaint 
against the Appellant alleging a violation of the "Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act'', 34-35-1 U.C.A., 1953, as amended 
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( I.R.1). Subsequent to the filing of the charge and pursuant 
to the provisions of the act an investigation was made by the 
Field Representative of the Industrial Commission and a pre-
liminary finding of discrimination was made by said Repre-
sentative ( I.R.5). Also, pursuant to the statute 34-3 5-7 ( 5) 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, an attempt was made to settle the 
Complaint by "conference, conciliation and persuasion" with 
no success. The Appellant, however, reacted to the finding 
of the Complaint by penalizing the Respondent in moving her 
from the Dispatch Department to a more menial task. She 
was restored the status of her former job only after the Indus-
trial Commission intervened on her behalf. ( I.R. 7 8) . 
Because of the failure to settle this matter the Industrial 
Commission set the matter for a formal hearing pursuant to 
the provisions of the statute. A rather protracted hearing was 
had on the matter and the Industrial Commission made a 
finding of discrimination and issued an order ( I.R. 295-310). 
The Appellant responded by filing an appeal pursuant to 34-
35-8 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, requesting a trial de novo. 
Pursuant to said Petition a trial de novo was had and the Dis-
trict Court sustained the findings of the Industrial Commission 
in its entirety and the Appellant then appealed to this Court. 
(R.29,30). 
2. STATE OF THE RECORD 
The Respondent sharply disagrees with the Appellant's 
Statement of Facts. The Respondent disagrees not only to the 
Statement of Facts, as delineated in Appellant's Brief, but to 
the state of the record that the Appellant claims existed in 
its arguments under those points alleging error in their Brief. 
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It is fundamental that when there is an appeal from an admin-
istrative ruling or an appeal from a District Court Order that 
one, on appeal, cannot reargue the factual matters which were 
determined at the Lower Court, when the findings are sus-
tained by competent and credible evidence. 
At the onset of the Respondent's claim the Appellant has 
stubbornly urged that the Respondent was not discriminated 
against because during the period in question there existed two 
separate jobs in the Dispatch Department of the Salt Lake 
Police Department, one being performed by male employees 
and one by female employees. The Appellant, at the investiga-
tory level, at the Industrial Commission and at the trial de 
novo, argued that the Respondent was not performing the same 
job as males. Not only in the Statement of Facts, but in other 
parts of the Brief the Appellant blatantly states that there is 
two separate jobs notwithstanding the fact that both the Indus-
trial Commission and the Trial Court found factually against 
this contention. In this connection, the Industrial Commission 
stated their position in this regard, as follows: 
"At the onset may we indicate we have no basic 
quarrel with the point made by the defendant that 
there can be two distinct jobs in the Dispatch Office, 
I.E., answering phone calls by one person and then an-
other person dispatching the information received by 
radio to the applicable police division for further action. 
What to do with a phone call certainly requires more 
know ledge and a quick thinking reaction than merely 
transmitting certain information. Regardless of the 
distinct duties purportedly shown by defendant, the evi-
dence in our opinion, does not show that a male or f e-
male was specifically assigned to one job to the ex-
clusion of the other." (Emphasis added) (I.R. 298). 
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The Trial Court, in his Findings of Fact, found: 
" ... 3. That the plaintiff performed the same 
services as male employees of Salt Lake City during 
the period in question in her job as Dispatcher, 
". . . 4. That the work performed by the plain-
tiff involved the same skill, effort and responsibility as 
the male employees, . . ." . ( R. 4 7, 48). 
The Appellant does not attack these findings as not being 
supported by the evidence, but, rather, reargues the factual 
matter and states its position that there was two distinct jobs 
as an absolute fact and reasons from this false premise. 
The evidence which was the basis for the foregoing find-
ings by the Lower Court clearly shows that the Respondent was 
performing identical duties as her male counterparts. Five 
police officers and one female Dispatcher, along with Mrs. 
Kopp, testified in regards to her position that the work done in 
the Salt Lake City Dispatch Office was identical in all respects 
to the work done by male employees who received a substan-
tial amount of money beyond that received by Mrs. Kopp. 
Testimony was tendered as to the type of job that Respondent 
had been working during the period in question. The Dispatch 
Office has the responsibility for receiving incoming calls of an 
emergency basis and assigning appropriate people to handle 
these situations. Basically, there were three dispatching posi-
tions in the dispatch room. These positions had a phone and 
three consoles. One of the monitors monitored not only the 
Police Department, but other agencies such as the Fire De-
partment, the Sheriff's Office, the Highway Patrol and the 
Airport Tower. (LR. 102). When there was a need for immedi-
ate police action, the phones would light up at all three differ-
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ent positions. As the phone rings, the person free responds 
to the same, notes the need and proceeds to dispatch appropriate 
personnel by the use of the console. In addition to the three 
consoles mentioned above, there was a fourth phone, however, 
this phone was not used very much. (LR. 105). Officer H. 
Lynn Burgan (LR. 82) was called and testified that he was 
a policeman for the Salt Lake City Corporation and had com-
menced working in the Dispatch Office in December, 1965. 
(LR. 83). Officer Burgon corroborated the testimony of Re-
spondent (LR. 84) and stated that there was no dis-
tinction between the type of duties that he performed in the 
Dispatch Office and those which Mrs. Kopp performed (LR. 
85) and testified further, that he was trained on the job by the 
Respondent. Officer Glen Grant also testified and corroborated 
the Respondent's testimony as to the duties of the dispatchers 
(LR. 91). He testified (LR. 126) as follows: 
"QUESTION: Now during the time that you worked 
with Ms. Kopp, did you in any manner do anything 
differently than what she did? 
ANSWER: No. She would relieve us for lunch 
break and we would relieve her for lunch break, but, 
aside from that, there was no distinction as to the type 
of work. We all handled exactly the same type of 
work." 
There seems to be no question that the police officers 
that were assigned to the Dispatch Off ice did not act in a super-
visory capacity over the other dispatchers (LR. 130, 131, 132). 
Patricia Lee Smith, a woman dispatcher, also testified and 
was asked whether or not there was any distinction between 
the work she did and the work male police officers did and she 
answered in the negative (LR. 13 3). Officer Floylynn Baker 
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testified that he had been assigned to the Dispatch Office and 
had been there continually since 1962. He testified as follows: 
"Mr. Moore: ... and have you worked with Mrs. 
Kopp? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
QUESTION: ... and have you and she done the 
same type of work? 
ANSWER: We have. 
QUESTION: Do you know of any distinction be-
tween the type of work you have done as opposed to 
what she had done? 
ANSWER: No." (I.R. 142). 
The Appellant called four witnesses none of which really 
refuted the basic fact that all personnel in the Dispatch Off ice 
performed the identical job, but, rather, testified as to the 
original plan and different classifications within the City. It 
was also admitted that the Respondent received at least $200.00 
a month less than her male counterparts. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT WAS EMPLOYED IN THE 
SAME JOB AS HER MALE COUNTERPARTS. 
The Appellant takes the position that since this is a case 
of first impression, this Court can look to those cases constru-
ing the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. 206 ( d 1) to afford 
some "guideline" in determining what interpretation should 
be placed on the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. The Respond-
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ent does not disagree that these cases may be helpful in under-
standing the intent and the effect in regards to anti-discrimi-
nation acts. The Respondent, in the main, has no objection 
to the cases cited by the Appellant as stating the applicable 
law in regards to interpretation of the Equal Pay Act. It ap-
pears to the Respondent, however, that the Appellant has 
strained to make distinctions between the Equal Pay Act and the 
Utah Discrimination Act. For example, the Appellant states 
that the job in question must be identical in nature before a 
discrimination charge will be sustained. Certainly, it would 
appear that the Utah Act is as broad as the Equal Pay Act and 
that the distinctions made by Appellant between "identical" and 
"substantially equal" is wholly affected..; , Nevertheless, even 
assuming that this was the Appellant's burden, the same was 
met by her at the numerous hearings on this matter. 
lviuch ado is made by the Appellant in citing Wirtz vs. 
Wheaton Glass Company, 284 F. Supp. 23 ( 1968) in sus-
taining the Appellant's position in this matter. The issue in 
that case was whether or not men and women were performing 
the same task when there existed a disparity in pay. The Lower 
Court made a finding that there were separate jobs and, as such, 
the basis of unequal pay was justified. Appellant is at a loss to 
meet the agreements set forth by the Federal District Judge in 
that case since the findings made are inconsistent with the 
findings made by the trier of the facts in this case. The Appel-
lant sluffs off the fact that this case, that is so copiously quoted 
in his Brief, was overruled by the Appellant Court. The Court 
of Appeals decision is entitled Shultz vs. Wheaton Glass Com-
pany, 421 F.2d 259, ( 1970). In this case the Court of Appeals 
found that the factual basis found by the Trial Court were 
"clearly erroneous" and the Court stated: 
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"We are not, however, bound by evidence which 
has not reached the status of a finding of fact, nor by 
conclusions which are legal inferences from facts." 
The Court held that the act could nor be thwarted by 
arbitrary job classifications. 
"Congress never intended, however, that an arti-
ficially created job classification which did not sub-
stantially differ from the general one could provide an 
escape for an employer from the operation of the Equal 
Pay Act. This should be too wide a door through which 
the content of the Act would disappear." 
There is a plethora of cases which the Courts have de-
cided that arbitrary distinctions are insufficient to negate the 
clear intent of the Act. Some of these cases are Shultz vs. 
Victoria National Bank. 420 F.2d 648, and Shultz vs. Wheaton 
Glass Company, 421 F2d 459. 
As has been stated earlier, Appellant bottoms his enme 
discussion of the applicable law on the assumption that there 
was two distinct jobs in the Dispatch Office in Salt Lake City. 
This factual matter has been determined against the Appellant 
and the trier of facts made this finding based upon sub-
stantial, credible evidence. That is to say, the Respondent 
agrees that the cases under the Equal Pay Act could negate the 
Appellant's claim if, in fact, two distinct jobs were being per-
formed during the period in question. This, however, was not 
the fact found at the Lower Court. 
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POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT WAS QUALIFIED TO BE A 
DISPATCHER. 
The Appellant argues that the Respondent's claim for dis-
crimination must be denied because she does not have the 
qualifications of a police officer assigned in the field. The 
gravamen of the Respondent's case is simply the fact that 
she was discriminated in her position as a dispatcher because 
she received a substantial lower amount of pay than male em-
ployees. The male employees were not limited only to police 
officers. Findings were made that the Respondent was well 
qualified as a dispatcher. It seems ironic that the Appellant 
would argue differently when the evidence shows that she 
trained policemen for their jobs as dispatchers and had the 
most intense and difficult job in the dispatch office when she 
was working with her male co-workers. The cases cited by 
the Appellant involved Civil Service situations and are not in 
po mt. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT IS 
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
At the Industrial Commission and again at the District 
Court level memorandum was submitted and at no time was it 
ever suggested by the Appellant that the Anti-Discrimination 
Act was just applicable to prospective jobs. Again, it is funda-
mental that a party cannot urge, for the first time on appeal, 
error on a point not raised at the Lower Court. See Huber vs. 
Deep Creek Irrigation Company, 6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2d 478; 
/l,fortenson vs. Financial Growth, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 54, 456 P.2d 
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181. However, it would appear that the Appellant's position, 
even at this late date, is without merit for the statute in question 
must be read in its total context. The statute provides as fol-
lows: Section 34-35-6 ( 1) Provides: 
"It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment 
practice: (a) For an employer to refuse to hire, to 
discharge, to promote or demote, or to discriminate 
in matters of compensation against any person other-
wise qualified, because of race, color, sex, religion, an-
cestry or national origin, [sic} (Emphasis added). 
The foregoing language is set in the present tense and 
would apply to any job presently held. The statute, however, 
goes on to state the situation which is applicable when one is 
applying for a job or position: 
"No applicant nor candidate for any job or posmon 
shall be deemed otherwise qualified" unless he or she 
possesses the education, training, ability, moral char-
acter, integrity, disposition to work, adherence to rea-
sonable rules and regulations, and other qualifications 
required by an employer for any particular job, job 
classification or position to be filled or created." (Em-
phasis added) 
In the actual context of the statute, therefore, the reason 
behind the future tense usage, "to be filled or created" becomes 
clear. If there is an applicant or candidate for a particular job, 
it must be one which is to be "filled or created". 
The Court found that the Applicant discriminated against 
the Respondent in matters of compensation, although she was 
otherwise qualified for the higher compensation because of her 
sex. 
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The Court further found that she was "otherwise quali-
fied" for the higher compensation since she was actually per-
forming the same work and had the same duties as male em-
ployees who received higher compensation. 
POINT IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND THE 
TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EFFECTUATED A 
REMEDY IN THIS CASE. 
As stated earlier, it is clear that one cannot raise, for the 
first time on appeal, an area not considered by the Lower Court. 
For the first time through the numerous protracted hearings on 
this matter, it is now urged that the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act is in violation of the Utah Constitution as an unlawful dele-
gation of a municipal function by the legislature. The Appel-
lant now urges that that part of 34-35-7 ( 12) UC.A., 1953, 
as amended, in regards to the affirmative action of allowing 
back pay is unconstitutional. (This argument is now made not-
withstanding the fact that the memorandums on this matter 
and the arguments seem to indicate that the main issue was that 
of equal pay). (LR. 297). This Court has held on numerous 
occasions that the issue of the constitutionality cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. See Chumney vs. Stott, 14 Utah 
2d 204, 381 P.2d 84 and In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 
384 P.2d 110. 
We have, already, eluded ad nauseam to the fact that the 
Appellant's discussion of the factual basis and his arguments 
were negated by the trier of the facts. Nevertheless the argu-
ments made that the disparity of wages was made because of 
"overqualified police officers" is a factual matter that has been 
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determined against the Appellant. In view of the foregoing, 
there is no need to argue the claims that the Industrial Com-
mission had "Uncontrolled discretion" and, as such, the statute 
in that regard is unconstitutional. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE COMPU-
TATION OF ITS AWARD. 
In arriving at what the proper computation should be in 
remedying the wrong of discrimination, both the Trial Court 
and the Industrial Commission found it reasonable to award 
back pay to the Respondent at the rate of the lowest paid man in 
the Dispatch Office during the period in question. We believe 
one cannot complain that an award was erroneous when it 
was based on the pay of the lowest man in the Dispatch Office 
at the time in question. 
POINT VI 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION SECTION AS-
SERTED BY THE APPELLANT IS NOT APPLI-
CABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The Appellant in making its argument in regards to the 
applicable statute of limitation assumes that Respondent's ac-
tion was one for back wages and, as such, the three year period 
of limitations is applicable. Mrs. Kopp's action was not for 
back wages, but was, rather, one for discrimination. The pur-
pose for the statute of limitation statutes is to prescribe the 
time in which an action may be filed and is not a criteria for 
the amount of damages to be awarded. At the Lower Court 
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the Appellant seemed to argue that Mrs. Kopp was only en-
titled to three years of back pay. It is not clear now what limi-
tations the Appellant is urging as it would appear that Mrs. 
Kopp, even under the Appellant's position, would be entitled 
to back pay three years prior to November 21, 1969 when she 
filed the Complaint. Under the Appellant's theory they are 
arguing that back pay could not be had prior to November 13, 
1966. Judgment was assessed based upon discrepancy of pay 
from July 1, 1965 until January 15, 1970 so, therefore, what 
is in issue is whether or not the computation of back pay, from 
May, 1966 until November of 1966, some seven months, was 
erroneous. 
The statute in this case, that is the Utah Discrimination 
Act, has unique features which is not found in most common 
law causes of action. The Act specifically and statutorily re-
quires an attempt to settle the matter between the parties prior 
to any formal action being commenced. The Utah Statute 
34-35-7 ( 12) UC.A. 1953, as amended, sets forth the re-
medial provisions of the Utah Discrimination Act and states 
in part as follows: 
"The Commission . . . to take such affirmative 
action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstate-
ment, or upgrading of employees, with or without back 
pay, ... " 
Both the Trial Court and the Industrial Commission 
deemed it appropriate in their orders to allow back pay to 
effectuate the purposes of the Anti-Discrimination Act. It 
would appear that this was an appropriate remedy in this case 
and that the trier of the facts wisely exercised its discretion be-
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cause any other remedy would require a participation m the 
running of the Police Department by the Industrial Commis-
sion. 
It is submitted that the cause of action did not occur when 
the initial act of discrimination occurred as alleged by the Ap-
pellant, but rather, vested with Mrs. Kopp when she was al-
lowed to intervene as set forth in sub-paragraph 8 of 34-35-7 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended, which provides in part as follows: 
"The respondent may file a written answer to the 
Complaint and appear at the hearing in person, or 
otherwise, with or without counsel and submit testi-
mony in the discretion of the hearing examiner, a com-
plainant may be allowed to intervene and present testi-
mony in person or by counsel." 
It appears then that only after there has been a break-
down by the Industrial Commission and the alleged discrimina-
tory employer does a cause of action vest in the Complainant. In 
this case the Complaint in Intervention was filed as soon as 
conciliation was unsuccessful and was, therefore, timely filed. 
It appears, therefore, that one cannot allow that the Respond-
ent failed to act timely. General authority sustains this position. 
See in 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, Section 121, page 26: 
"Where the statute provides, in words or in ef-
fect, a limitation on actions on a liability created by 
statute, it is generally true that the cause of action does 
not accrue within the statute of limitations until the 
violation of the statute occurs, or plaintiff has a right 
of action, and this is determined by the provisions of 
of the statute creating the right and remedy; but, where 
the statute provides that an action to enforce a liability 
created by law must be brought within a specified 
period after the discovery of the facts on which the 
liability was created, limitations run from the date of 
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such creation, and not from the date on which a cause 
of action to enforce the liability accrued to the aggriev-
ed party." (Emphasis added) 
See also 54 C.J.S., Section 110, page 15, which states: 
"Where a party's right depends on the happening 
of an event in the future, the cause of action accrues, 
and the statute of limitations begins to run, only at the 
time when the event happens. This rule applies where 
a right of action on a barred debt is revived by a new 
promise which is to be fulfilled on the happening of 
some contingency or the occurrence of some other fu-
ture event. Where there is no present right to pursue, 
a particular remedy against a party, but such right arises 
only on the doing of an act by him which puts him in 
default, the statute runs only from the default. 
Whether the contingency affects the right or 
merely the amount of recovery, the rule is the same; 
if plaintiff is entitled to recover a greater or smaller 
amount, dependent on a certain contingency which may 
or may not happen, the statute runs against him only 
after the amount to which he is entitled becomes cer-
tain. 
POSSIBILITY. As long as the happening of the 
contingency remains a possibility, the running of the 
statttte is postponed." (Emphasis added) . 
The situation here cannot be made, as the City has at-
tempted to, analogize to an action for back wages. Rather, 
this is an action based upon discrimination where the Petitioner, 
the Respondent, timely filed for relief and the Commission 
properly effectuated a remedy authorized by statute. 
There is a plethora of cases which shows that awarding 
of back pay is not designed to effectuate damages to the plain-
tiff, but, rather, for a vindication of policies of a particular 
15 
act. See NLRB vs. United Nuclear Corporation, C.A. 10, 1967, 
381 F.2d 972; NLRB vs. Sunshine Mining Company, 125 F.2d 
757; NLRB vs. Thompson Products, C.A. 6, 1942, 130 F.2d 
363; Harkless vs. Sweeney Independent School District, 422 
F.2d 319, CA. 5, 1970;]. H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Com-
pany vs. PLRB, C.A. 5, 1968, 399 F.2d 356. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Legislature passed a rather broad act making it 
unlawful to discriminate in ones employment because of sex. 
The record is clear, and the trier of the case found: 
1. That the Respondent performed the identical job as 
her male co-employees. 
2. That the Respondent exercised and performed the 
same work as the male employees with the same skill, effort 
and responsibility. 
That the only distinction between the Respondent and 
her male co-employees was her sex and the amount of com-
pensation she received. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
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